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This paper considers what light the associational forms that Gandhi created shed on 
the debate about civil society and the public sphere in political and social theory. 
As John Keane remarks, “reflexive, self-organizing non-governmental 
organizations that some call civil society can and do live by other names in other 
linguistic and cultural milieus” (Keane 1998: 55). How does his “Indian” variant 
square with the practice and concept of civil society and public sphere as they have 
evolved in European history, thought and practice? 
 
 
C I V I L  S O C I E T Y  A N D  P U B L I C  S P H E R E  
A S  B O U R G E O I S  R A T I O N A L I T Y  
 
The discourse and practice of civil society have had a lively career in the 1990s, 
passing through numerous incarnations and representations that range from 
revolutionary – as in Eastern Europe – to collaborative. Civil society, Charles 
Taylor tells us, refers to a space that exists “over against the state, in partial 
independence from it. It includes those dimensions of social life which cannot be 
confounded with or swallowed up in the state”(Taylor 1990: 95). Taylor stresses 
the obstreperous, challenging aspect of civil society, the aspect that showed its face 
in the Narmada movement in India, in the WTO protests in the US, the contest over 
electoral corruption in Korea, the non-violent protests of the Chipko movement. 
But there are other ways to read it.  
                                                 
1  This paper was presented by Susanne Hoeber Rudolph as the keynote speech at the 
17th European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, held in Heidelberg, September 
9-14, 2002. It draws on a longer essay to be published by Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi, in a volume on civil society edited by Carolyn Elliott. Susanne Rudolph is the 
William Benton Distinguished Service Professor Emerita in Political Science, University of 
Chicago (eMail: srudolph@midway.uchicago.edu) and Lloyd Rudolph is Professor 
Emeritus in Political Science, University of Chicago (eMail: l-rudolph@uchicago.edu). 
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The Oxford English dictionary sounds a more gentle tone, stressing mutuality and 
douceur as aspects of civic society: “having a proper social order,” keeping “a 
certayn civile iustice and friendly love to one another” (Hooker, 1600), or 
“reformed, civill, full of good”(Shakespeare, 1591, in Two Gentlemen of 
Verona)”.2 The Oxford Dictionary sounds rather like a text for Robert Putnam’s or 
James Coleman’s idea of social capital – the capacity to trust and habits of 
collaboration.3 It is a vision which expresses itself in Rotary clubs, soccer clubs, 
Parent Teacher Associations, Lok Sevak Sanghs, associations of and for the 
homeless, and other friendly associations.  
 Civil society has also become a vehicle for discussing transitions to democracy 
in authoritarian states of the South. The question arises whether these countries 
have a social sphere autonomous of the state, an associational life that aggregates 
persons as citizens acting jointly for political purposes, and which serves as the 
platform for articulating democratic demands. The discussion of how Gandhi’s 
program bears on Indian civil society is relevant to this latter question. 
 Transplanting concepts such as civil society and public sphere, born and used 
in Anglo-American liberal contexts, requires re-calibrating the concept for use in 
the context of other histories and social structures. When talking about India, we 
have the excuse that so much of the liberal tradition was transplanted in the course 
of 19th century nationalist discourse and practice, as also in the constitution of 
1950, that the concept of civil society can claim a comfortable home. But 
definitions of political categories are often captive to their point of first use in a 
European historical context.4 As the concept of civil society travels out of its 
quintessential 18th century European origin point to new temporal locations in the 
twentieth century and to new cultural locations outside the West, it expresses itself 
through different cultural forms and takes on different meanings. Indeed it was one 
of Gandhi's unique talents to give new shape to institutional forms and meanings 
associated with liberal and democratic spheres. 
 Jürgen Habermas’ Public Sphere is part of the same theoretical family as civil 
society. The version of civil society as expressed in his Strukturwandel der 
Öffentlichkeit (Habermas 1989) will serve me as the theoretical backboard off 
which to bounce a consideration of Gandhi’s associational inventions. The 
coffeehouse stands as a heuristic marker for Habermas, the Ashram as a marker for 
Gandhi. Strukturwandel established Habermas’ position as a defender of the 
enlightenment project of modernity against the critics of the modern, among whom 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982). 
3 See Robert Putnam (1993) and James Coleman (1990). 
4 See for example my defense of treating transnational religious movements as an aspect of 
transnational civil society, in Rudolph (1997). 
 SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH/LLOYD I. RUDOLPH 
 
3 
Gandhi is one. Habermas created categories and representations that highlight the 
contrast between the Gandhian and European variants of civil society.5 
 When Habermas examined England, France and Germany he found that the 
public sphere came into being in Europe in the eighteenth century, creating the 
ground for democratic participation.6 It was embodied in coffee houses, political 
clubs and literary journals. 
 
There sprang from the midst of the private sphere [he writes] a 
relatively dense network of public communication. The growing 
number of readers [...] was complemented by a considerable 
expansion in the production of books, journal and papers [...] The 
societies for enlightenment, cultural associations, secret freemasonry 
lodges and orders of illuminati were associations constituted by the 
free, that is, private decisions of their founding members, based on 
voluntary membership and characterized internally by egalitarian 
practices of sociability, free discussion, decision by majority etc. 
(Habermas in Calhoun 1992: 422). 
 
In these locations persons who previously led separate lives in private spaces come 
together and become a public, transcending their private preoccupations and 
addressing common purposes. The communicative process directed at common 
questions creates a unified public. Communicating with each other, social actors 
learn to share ideas. Their communication is marked by certain features, by 
rationality, by disinterestedness, by the irrelevance of inherited identities to their 
deliberation, and by a rigorous separation of the private and public spheres. 
 First, rationality. Habermas’ discourse implies the public interest can only be 
arrived at through acts of reasoning that conform to formal notions of rationality 
and rules of deductive logic. He imagines public intellectuals in engagement with 
each other. As Eley (1992: 293) suggests: “The faculty of publicness begins with 
reading, thought, and discussion, with reasonable exchange among equals, and it is 
this ideal which really focuses Habermas’ interest”. Habermas’ faith in the power 
                                                 
5 The “original” 1962 Habermas has a more restrictive vision of civil society, focussing on 
narrowly political associations with a strong rationalist and speech-act oriented dimension. 
The Habermas who appeared at a panel on his work in 1989 had expanded his horizons to 
include associations with mainly social ends. 
 
The institutional core of ‘civil society’ is constituted by voluntary unions 
outside the realm of the state and the economy and ranging [...] from 
churches, cultural associations, and academies to independent media, sport 
and leisure clubs, debating societies, groups of concened citizens, and grass-
roots petitioning drives all the way to occupational associations, political 
parties, labor unions, and ‘alternative’ institutions (Calhoun 1992: 253). 
 
6 For an account and analysis of the emergence of opinion and the rise of parties see Lloyd 
I. Rudolph, “The Origin of Party: From the Politics of Status to the Politics of Opinion in 
Eighteenth Century England and America,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of 
Government, Harvard University, 1956. 
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of communicative action makes him a denizen of that German tradition, leading 
back to Hegel, which imagined that the philosopher could, by speech acts and 
reason, break out of the objectification wrought by social forces such as capitalism 
and mass culture.  
 The deliberations that take place in the Public Sphere are not based on the 
common sense of ordinary people. Habermas explicitly brackets what he calls 
“mere opinion” as not the same as “public opinion”. Public opinion is the outcome 
of the deliberated, reflective consideration of bourgeois educated persons, while 
“mere opinion” consists of “things taken for granted, normative convictions,” and 
“collective prejudices” (Seidman 1989: 232). His exclusions remind of the 
exclusions common in the 18th century British political arena where the coffee 
house began. In that arena, what was called “opinion out of doors”, that is, opinion 
outside the deliberative circle of parliament, was regarded not only as inferior but 
as illegitimate.  
 Habermas’ volume traces a downward historical trajectory, following the 
degeneration of the Public Sphere from its peak moment in the 18th century. He 
articulates a pessimism common in the 1960s among conservative American 
sociologists and among critical Frankfurt Schoolers. Both expected to be 
overwhelmed by the deluge of mass culture, commodity fetishism, and vulgar 
interests. Associations marked by “convivial social intercourse and by a relatively 
high standard of education” engage in rational consideration of public issues only 
for a brief, transitional historical moment. 
 
[...] they developed only in a specific phase of bourgeois society, and 
only by virtue of a specific constellation of interests could they be 
incorporated in the order of the bourgeois constitutional state 
(Seidman 1989: 232).  
 
Then begins the decline. The public sphere is superceded when the bourgeoisie 
loses its short-lived monopoly of opinion and begins to be pressed by a widening 
democratization of the public. The forces that obliterate communicative action are 
mass culture, consumerism, capitalism, the proliferation of private interest. Coffee 
houses and political clubs are overrun by the competitive and presumably non-
rational processes of “pressure of the streets” and cruder forms of interest 
confrontation. 
 Habermas’ pessimistic framing of this move toward democratization is 
governed by his privileging of the “rational” over the democratic. The rationality of 
a proper “public sphere” will be crowded out by the irrationalities of democratic 
mobilization. Real deliberation on the common good will be overrun by the narrow 
interests of organized pressure groups. Public spheres and their rational focus on a 
common interest are hazarded by democratization and mass politics.7 
                                                 
7 Habermas speaks of a “weakening of the public sphere”; of the public sphere becoming “a 
field for competition among interests in the cruder form of forcible confrontations”; “Laws 
that have obviously originated under the ‘pressure of the streets’ can scarcely continue to be 
understood in terms of a consensus achieved by private persons in public discussion”. 
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The disinterested, rationalist nature of the deliberation in the coffee house is 
grounded in Habermas’ severe dichotomization of the private and the public. 
Interest is a product of the private sphere, disruptive of public wealth.8 In this, 
Habermas stands in line with the dominant tendency in European political and 
social theory. For Aristotle, the family was private and pre-political; the polis is 
public and political. Politics lives in a compartmentalized arena where rationality is 
uncontaminated by the preoccupations o f the private person. 
 To summarize, the civil society associations instanced in Strukturwandel der 
Öffentlichkeit have a number of attributes which will anchor our discussion of 
Gandhi’s variants of civil society and public sphere. They are voluntary, not 
coerced; they are located in public spaces – the “coffeehouse” – that are explicitly 
separated from the (private) sphere of house and home; they are marked by an 
opposition between private and public that impugns the private as the realm of 
personal interests, disruptive to the public interest; they are skewed toward the 
intelligentsia, not plebeians, presuming literate if not literary skills; they are 
grounded in rationalist forms of deliberation which implicitly exclude the force of 
residual inherited identities – ethnicity, religion – which are seen to live in the 
arena of private interest. 
 The Ashram transgresses almost all of these desiderata. It complies with the 
first condition – the ashram like the coffee house is voluntary. But there the overlap 
ends. The Ashram encompasses illiterate plebeians as well as literate public 
intellectuals, assumes the relevance of inherited identities – such as ethnicity and 
religion – not only in private but in public space; and it merges the home and the 
political arena, the private and the public. 
 
I N D I A N  V A R I A N T S  O F  P U B L I C  S P H E R E  
A N D  C I V I L  S O C I E T Y  
 
How does the theory of public sphere travel in the Indian and in the Gandhian 
environment? In India, Partha Chatterjee would like to restrict the concept to 
“those institutions of modern associational life set up by nationalist elites in the era 
of colonial modernity, [...] often as part of the colonial struggle”.9 He would limit it 
                                                                                                                            
Deploring the “refeudalization” of the public sphere he notes that “today [publicness] has 
[...] been enlisted in the aid of the secret policies of interest groups” (Seidman 1989: 236). 
Much of this is reminiscent of the impatience with political bargaining that lies behind Max 
Weber’s distaste for democratic politics.  
8 There is a deviant lineage in the western tradition which argues otherwise. See Althusius 
(1995: 32). His pluralist view of the polity as constituted by a graduated set of socio-
political units encompasses the family as a basic unit: “By politics alone arises the wisdom 
for governing and administering the family”. 
9 ‘Beyond the Nation? or Within?’, Economic and Political Weekly, January 4-11, 1997, 
pp.30-34, 32. Chatterjee's article recognizes the distinction between the traditional 
definition of civil society and public sphere and the Gandhian variant of this definition 
which we are about to elaborate. But he would prefer, apparently in the interest of heuristic 
sharpness, to “retain the term civil society [for] those characteristic institutions of modern 
associational life originating in western societies that are based on equality, autonomy, 
freedom of entry and exit, contract, deliberative procedures of decision-making, recognized 
 SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH/LLOYD I. RUDOLPH 
 
6 
to Indian cousins of the Habermasian coffee house. And indeed, the nineteenth 
century specimens of voluntary associations, the Deccan Educational Society, the 
Brahmo Samaj, the Indian Association, the Prarthana Samaj, the Poona Sarvajanik 
Sabha fit rather well with the 18th century rationalist, voluntary, bourgeois, public 
sphere imagery that Habermas offers. 
 The trouble with these distinctly liberal nationalist organizations is that they 
were restricted to a tiny, English speaking urban elite. It was only when the 
nationalist movement was transformed into a popular agitation, first with mass 
resistance to the partition of Bengal in 1905 and then in the Gandhian period, that it 
began to reach significant publics. It began spawning collective action not easily 
contained within the sober, rationalist descriptors of the public sphere. Liberals like 
Ranade and Gokhale were one thing, religiously and plebeian toned reformers such 
J.G. Phule, Shri Narayana Guru and Gandhi himself another. Social movements 
were deeply infiltrated by the symbolism, relationships, and practices of a society 
that was rural, religious, collectively organized, and predominantly illiterate. 
Bayly, in an argument that provides a historical space for civil society in 18th 
century India suggests that such activity was carried on in the arena of religious 
discourses, the dominant site for ethical reflection and normative practice (Bayly 
1999: 180-211). Indian associational life in the nationalist era reflected the society 
into which it was introduced, where realms of life, private/public, religious/secular, 
chosen/inherited had not been sharply differentiated. Civil society looked different. 
 One problem in asking the civil society/public sphere question in India is that 
one is moved, by the 18th century European genealogies of civil society, to look to 
urban contexts. The rural as an arena does not appear on the horizon, or only 
marginally. A coffee house in a wheat field? Marx spoke for a general theoretical 
perspective among modernists when he supposed that peasants did not enter “into 
manifold relations with one another.” They were homologous units; like so many 
potatoes in a sack, they made nothing more cohesive than a sackful of potatoes.10 
They had no civil society. 
 
 
T H E  A S H R A M  A S  P U B L I C  S P H E R E ?  
 
Wherever Gandhi’s mass politics project traveled, in South Africa or in India, his 
first step was to create a center, an ashram–although he did not call it that until he 
came to India. He created seven in all, two in South Africa, five in India. Here the 
                                                                                                                            
rights and duties of members [...]” even though non-western countries provide “numerous 
examples of the emergence of what could well be called civil-social institutions which 
nevertheless do not always conform to these principles.” It is a position that denies (on 
historical grounds? on normative grounds?) the fluidity and adaptability of institutions. This 
is a different theoretical road than the one which we adopted in an earlier work in which we 
argued that “caste associations” represent a hybrid form of civil society which transgresses 
the dichotomy between ascribed and voluntary groups. See our The Modernity of Tradition: 
Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Reprint, 1996). 
10 See Karl Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon’, Selected Works (New 
York, n.d.), II, p.415. 
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vanguard participants of his movement could live together, the dedicated and 
trained resistance professionals who were key for his mass mobilization projects, 
the Delhi Satyagraha, the South African political marches, the Dandi salt march. 
Ashrams are retreats for those who wish to join a community of dedication, usually 
to a normative or spiritual life, in Gandhi’s case also to wider political interests and 
to social service – projects Gandhi regarded as paired.11 
 Gandhi initiated these arenas to reach into rural India, beyond the literary elites 
to a non-literate mass public. Is deliberation in the public sphere conditioned on 
literacy? What happens to systems of communication, essential to the formation of 
civil society, when the potential citizens can neither read or write and before 
oral/visual mass communication provide another means of communication? When 
Gandhi attempted to create a public sphere, in 1900 in South Africa, in the 1920s in 
India, most villagers and towns people were not only illiterate but had neither radio 
nor television. 
 I mentioned before that the Habermasian coffeehouse does not function with 
public opinion defined as common sense but opinion as the fruit of a highly 
cultivated rationalism. Gandhi, in building a mass public, defines public opinion as 
common sense and assumes that common sense is widely distributed. 
 Gandhi did not assume a public sphere was conditional on literacy. He was 
aware that public deliberations and cultural performance reach high levels of 
complexity under conditions of low literacy. In India, Drama (traveling theatre)12 
domestic oral compositions (grandmother’s tales)13 and public oratory (the juridical 
deliberations of caste and village panchayats) regularly engage ordinary non-
literate people in complex and sophisticated cultural production and 
communication.14 To create a “public” focused on matters of public concern under 
conditions of non-literacy requires forms of organization different from the coffee 
house and the literary journal, forms in which exemplification and performance 
play a visible role. Satyagrahas were elaborately choreographed, though of simple 
materials. 
 The Gandhian ashram expanded the concept of a public sphere from emphasis 
on the discursive exchanges of educated men to exemplary performances whose 
enactment would provide political education and trigger mass discussions. 
Satyagrahas were not just large scale assertions of non-violent resistance. They 
were political theatre, pedagogic drama for launching dramatic actions designed to 
politicize millions of people, including uneducated rural and urban folk, alerting 
them to issues, engaging them in public debate. 
                                                 
11 India saw a proliferation of ashrams in the 19th and 20th centuries, institutions which 
mixed classical models with more recent institutional forms and spiritual needs. The forms 
also traveled across denominational lines, to Christians and New Agers. For an introduction 
to the forms and review of historical instances see Richard Taylor (1986). 
12 See Susan Seizer, [Dissertation on traveling village drama troupe] (Ph.D. dissertation in 
the Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, Spring 1997). 
13 See A.K. Ramanujan (1991: Introduction). 
14 For a remarkable display of juridical village rhetoric see the documentary, “Courts and 
Councils”, made by the University of Wisconsin and available from its Center of South 
Asian Studies. 
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T H E  P R I V A T E  A S  P U B L I C  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  
 
A crucial feature guaranteeing the disinterested rationality of Habermas’ public 
sphere is the insulation of the public from the private, the private which is seen as 
the realm of private interest, of “Normative opinions” and “collective prejudices”. 
Gandhi’s strategy of reaching wider constituencies and his moral conviction about 
the unity between the public and the private self conspired to have him transgress 
this dichotomy. That transgression has to be read against the complex meanings of 
public/private harbored by Indian society–meanings to which conventional 
European usage is a poor guide. The meaning of privacy is modified by the 
structure of the family and the pattern of housing and rural settlement. In multi-
generational (“joint”) families with strong collective norms, privacy has little 
meaning; surveillance of the most trivial or intimate acts was/is common.15 The 
borders of what constitutes privacy become problematic when the family reaches 
beyond the nuclear unit and constitutes a small community, an incipient public. 
Again, in villages and hamlets, most quotidian activity is accomplished on 
verandas or in courtyards, within sight of the neighbors, in “public.” Privacy is 
more an urban than a rural phenomenon, and a luxury of the walled-in middle class 
rather than the open-air poor. 
 Many nominally private practices in India display in public and for the sake of 
public certification personal acts that begin in and belong to the private sphere: the 
pulling of the headcloth over the face designating a woman’s modesty; the tying of 
the dhoti designating caste status; the choice of or mix of desi and angrezi dress 
forms; the participation in a public meal; the marriage of two incompatibly ranked 
social actors display in public for the sake of approbation or defiance personal acts 
that begin in and belong to the private sphere. A narrow view of politics would 
relegate these to the private. 
 Yet the most fundamental social transformations that Indian reformers have 
sought to accomplish in the last hundred years have been as much embedded in 
private as in public spheres. Major public figures engaged in the search for just and 
meaningful social practices among the conflicting claims that the colonial situation 
generated often affected the public sphere most profoundly by performing some act 
of private deviation – marrying a widow; crossing the ocean; ignoring the family’s 
conventional commensal rules. As the feminists say, the personal is political. When 
these individual transgressions proliferated, and reformers sought social legislation 
to modify oppressive private practices – The Age of Consent Act; the Widow 
Remarriage Act – the claim of privacy, that intimate spheres are beyond the reach 
of public scrutiny, or at least beyond the scrutiny of the colonial state, was 
                                                 
15 For an extended discussion of the crosscultural meaning of “Privacy” see Susanne 
Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph (2000); Introduction to Part V, “Private Lives in 
Patriarchal Space”. 
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invoked.16 What Gandhi did was to assert the opposite, that all private matters – or 
most – were on the table. 
 The Tolstoy farm in South Africa was constructed as a model of the imagined 
India, a diverse India, and its private negotiation of those differences were 
displayed in public through Gandhi’s prolific publications. Public Opinion was one 
(Gandhi 1928: 134).17 Navajivan and Young India reached a circulation of 40,000. 
The accounts are full of the quotidian details of negotiating the integration of 
private difference into a public space. How to arrange feeding? By allowing every 
family to work their own kitchen, as religious, caste, and culture based differences 
might dictate? The Ashram dwellers came from a society in which inter-dining was 
forbidden by ideas of caste purity and pollution. If they were to eat in a common 
kitchen, an act of social transgression, how to mediate between meat-eaters and 
vegetarians? The conundrum appears to have been settled by Gandhi's usual 
negotiated voluntarism, not unsurprisingly on the side of vegetarianism. Dish 
washing arrangements were partly designed to override residual reservations about 
purity and pollution: no one was exempted from the cleaning of common dishes.18 
 The Ashram as vehicle of displaying the private in public became a species of 
road show, moving its performances around India and recreating its forms of life at 
each of the major reform and resistance sites – in Champaran in 1917, in Kheda in 
1918, on the salt march in 1930. Part of the road show was the visible practice of 
simplicity: performing menial work, wearing plain clothes, living in unfurnished 
environments, doing for yourself, working with comrades of diverse religion and 
ethnicity. It was a multi-valenced practice, signifying the asceticism of the 
religious seeker, an abjuring of private self-indulgence in favor of the public 
interest, identification with the least, and a strike at the hierarchical and exclusivist 
features of Indian civilization. 
 Many of the middle class professionals who came to the nationalist cause came 
with Habermasian assumptions about the division between public and private 
spheres. They would gladly have collaborated in the public realm, shielding the 
more difficult and precious private arena of sectarian, class and caste practices 
behind the claim of private space. Dismantling the public/private boundary enabled 
the unabashed invasion of the private practices that drew the boundaries 
constituting caste and religious difference. 
 The exemplary performances of simplicity at Champaran, in Bihar, during 
Gandhi's work on behalf of the indigo labor force in 1918 offer a famous example. 
The volunteers whom Gandhi had recruited for this campaign were prosperous 
                                                 
16 M.G. Ranade (1842-1901), who favored social reform as an appropriate issue for the 
Indian National Congress, was forced to back off when it became apparent social reform, as 
against political freedom, would deeply divide the Congress. 
17 For the massive repercussions in India of the violence committed against the South 
African strikers in 1913, including Viceroy Lord Harding’s surprising condemnation of the 
South African authorities, and G.K. Gokhale’s amplification to India of the news he 
received from South Africa, see Gandhi (1928: 286). 
18 “There was to be one single kitchen, and all were to dine in a single row. Everyone was 
to see to the cleaning of his own dish and other things. The common pots were to be 
cleaned by different parties in turn” (Gandhi 1928: 216). 
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upper caste advocates, who helped bring court cases to challenge labor-hostile laws 
and help take witness from the laborers. They assumed serving the movement was 
compatible with upper caste life styles. Gandhi teased them into shame, and coaxed 
them into adopting the egalitarian practices of the Ashram. 
 
 Writes Gandhi: 
 
The curious ways of living of my companions in the early days were a 
constant theme of raillery at their expense. Each of the vakils had a 
servant and a cook, and therefore a separate kitchen, and they often 
had their dinner as late as midnight. Though they paid their own 
expenses, the irregularity worried me, but as we had become close 
friends [...] they received my ridicule in good part. Ultimately it was 
agreed that the servants should be dispensed with, that all the kitchens 
should be amalgamated, and that regular hours should be observed [...] 
it was also felt necessary to insist on simple meals (Gandhi 1957: 
417).19  
 
Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who became India’s first president, was one of the advocates. 
He wryly recalls his experiments with simplicity, trying to figure out how to lower 
a clay pot by rope into the village well, to the immense amusement of the locals.20 
 These practices demanded a sharing of common social premises: simplicity and 
abstinence from servants, saving money, dignifying labor, enacting respect for 
tasks performed by the humble. The lawyers who signed up with Gandhi, hadn’t 
counted on cleaning their own chamber pots. This public sphere made greater 
demands than the coffee house, excavating the political meaning of private life-
ways, buttresses of the deepest inequalities and oppressions of Indian society. The 
enactment in the ashram of multi-ethnicity, encompassing several Indian regional-
linguistic subcultures; of ecumenism, grounded not in a privatization of religion but 
in a deliberate ethic of mutual respect for publicly practiced religiosity; and of 
cross-caste neighborliness, made the ashram as theater, the model and exemplar of 
an imagined society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 It is not our objective in this paper to analyze Gandhi’s rhetoric, but it is worth pointing 
out that Gandhi’s accounts of the Ashram’s negotiated voluntarism report no agents: “It 
was agreed”, “it was decided upon”. The various decisions to create a common vegetarian 
kitchen, at Tolstoy Farm, at Champaran, appear to happen without the active intervention of 
any advocate or persuader, but rather appear as the fortuitous and appropriate result of a 
spontaneous consensual expression of ashram souls. 
20 See Rajendra Prasad (1956). 
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T H E  C O F F E E  H O U S E  A N D  T H E  A S H R A M :  
C O N T R A S T S ,  C O N G R U E N C E S  
 
Among the features that distinguish the ashram from the 18th century political club 
is the religious grammar in which the ashram is embedded as against the 
enlightenment rationalism of the club. Yet we ought not draw too sharp a 
distinction: the Gandhian ashram is about civic virtue, service to a general interest, 
and the creation of a just society. Gandhi would align with Habermas’ 
understanding of a decline in the public sphere due to the proliferation and 
institutionalization of private “interest”. The ashram’s idea of service which builds 
on models of religious obligation as well as self-abnegating asceticism sits 
somewhat awkwardly with rationalism. Yet it points in a similar direction as the 
civic virtue face of the public sphere. 
 Voluntarism, free entry and exit, are features in which associations operating in 
a public sphere overlap with the ashram. Ashrams, writes Richard Taylor, “may be 
the only traditional kind of Indian association (perhaps along with some bhakti 
groups) that are outside the [...] conditions of ascriptive membership – at least in 
theory, if not always in practice” (Taylor 1986: 20). Volunteers “applied” to the 
ashrams, alerted by the fame of Gandhi’s projects. Some arrived in the spirit of 
novices entering a religious order, some in the spirit of peace corps volunteers. 
Neither ethnicity nor caste nor religion nor nationality qualified or disqualified. 
Those, for whom it was too much or too little, left. Entry by merit, exit by choice. 
 The ashram’s projects were/are based on a more holistic vision than that of the 
coffee house, of how to improve the human condition. In the world of the 
coffeehouse, the political is separable from other spheres, from personal vocation, 
religion, ethnic and other “primal” solidarities. The Public Sphere focuses on 
politics. The ashram embodies the belief, more native to the religious than the 
political adept that social change comes about through the ethical and moral 
transformation of selves rather than through public and political institutions. 
Gandhi formed his first ashram in the grip of a “spell” cast by Ruskin’s espousal of 
such a holistic vision.21 After reading Unto This Last, the four political economy 
essays that constituted Ruskin’s slashing attack on market capitalism and modern 
society,22 he made himself a promise that reaches well beyond political agendas: “I 
determined to change my life in accordance with the ideals of the book” (Gandhi 
1957: 298). The ashram was established in part to enable its indwellers to practice 
a community of virtue: dedicated to the collective good; to the belief that all work 
is equally worthy; to the conviction that the life of tillers and craftsmen is worth 
living (Gandhi 1957: 299).  
                                                 
21 “One of the great prophetic books of the nineteenth century”, which “pierces through the 
smoke-screen of classical economics, and reveals true human realities”. Kenneth Clark 
(1982: 265). 
22 See Clive Wilmer’s review of six books on Ruskin that herald the “return” of this 
alternately celebrated and shunned figure, “Go to Nature,” Times Literary Supplement, 
April 7, 2000, pp.3-4. 
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In Gandhi’s view the state is too frail, even impotent, to be the arena of a public 
good. The locus of true power being the civil society on which the state is 
ultimately dependent, civil society becomes the proper arena for change. 
Deliberations in the public sphere are predicated on the assumption of a state that 
will execute the general interest that evolves. But for the Gandhian ashram, it is the 
transformation of inner selves, of the will and intent of human actors, that is the 
path to social change. Thus the world views and behaviors that constitute the 
practice of injustice, such as beliefs in untouchability or extortionate dowry 
practices are not affected by the weak hand of legislation, but by persuasion and 
the enactment of justice, routinized in committed associations. Change is more than 
a political act – for which the coffee house and the political club are sufficient, 
influencing legislation, public policy and public sanctions. Change for Gandhi is a 
societal act engaging subjectivities as well as political structures. Such a political 
process requires bearers other than the limited and rationalist forms of the 18th 
century coffee house, pub and literary society. 
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